Descartes and the Limits of Doubt

I have been reading Descartes today, or more specifically, I have been reading Meditations on First Philosophy, the famous essay in which Descartes proclaims 'ego sum, ego existo'. I am very interested in this essay, but not for Descartes argument against universal doubt or his speculation regarding the mind. Instead, I am interested in the problems which troubled Descartes and why doubt, or lack of certitude, would be a problem in the first instance,

If I am to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences, I must once and for all, and by a deliberate effort, rid myself of all those opinions to which I have hitherto given credence, starting entirely anew, and building from the foundations up ... In so doing, it will not be necessary for me to show that they are one and all false; that is perhaps more than can be done. But since reason has already persuaded me that I ought to withhold belief no less carefully from things not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly false, I shall be justified in setting all of them aside ... I shall proceed by setting aside all that admits even of the very slightest doubt, just as if I had convicted it of being absolutely false; and I shall persist in following this path, until I have come upon something certain.

I find it fascinating that Descartes would set "aside all that admits even the slightest of doubt", rid himself of all those opinions to which he had "hitherto given credence", to start "entirely anew" and build "from the foundations up"; and yet, still hold steady in the opinion that he "ought to withhold belief no less carefully from things not entirely certain ... than from those which appear manifestly false", and to claim that he is therefore "justified in setting all of them aside". I might inquire: justified by what when every opinion to which he had "hitherto given credence", "all that admits even the slightest of doubt", has been set aside? What, in such an instance, would serve to justify anything at all? I am inclined to the view, that Descartes, despite an heroic attempt to set aside each and every one of his opinions, did not complete the job thoroughly, and that, perhaps, if he had done so, might have recognised the folly of the problem which he set out to solve.

If Descartes wanted certainty then certainty is easily had, and by no means does it require any great philosophical investigation. A great many people throughout history have been certain, absolutely so, of some view or another, and often quite as certain that others, equally certain of opposing views, have misplaced their certainty. The problem with certainty, if misplaced, is its resistence to change, even when its persistence can have dire consequences. I do not follow Descartes with his aversion to doubt, but instead I encourage doubt, and I persist in doubting even that which I cannot imagine to be false--that is our defence against conceit and hubris. It is not a problem when some opinion, view, theory, proposition, or whatever, is doubted, but rather the problem is when there is certainty, for certitude is the harbinger of dogma, irrevocable doctrine, and the death of rational discussion.

I am, at times, confounded by those who would happily echo my above sentiments, and yet continue in the pursuit of certitude, to some degree or another, licensed by reason. There is an implicit conflict, present in the works of many philosophers, where dogmatism or certitude is at once frowned upon and also longed for, and that it is not found or forthcoming is considered a problem to try and solve. The fear is that without certainty, anarchy reigns. In the words of Descartes,

Archimedes, that he might displace the whole earth, required only that there might be some one point, fixed and immovable, to serve in leverage; so likewise I shall be entitled to entertain high hopes if I am fortunate enough to find some one thing that is certain and indubitable.

If there is no "one point, fixed and immovable, to serve in leverage", then we drift into nothingness, and with nothing to establish confidence, security upon or find comfort in. I am of the view that, like the earth itself, rationality and knowledge are in no need of a firm foundation, or "one point, fixed and immovable, to serve as leverage". I admit, there is no security or comfort to be found in this view, confidence and certainty offer no protection against failure, and we are on our own, without an authority to guide us, to decide for ourselves at each and every step, what problems we are interested in and what answers we think are satisfactory solutions. It is, perhaps, fitting that I now doubt that Descartes would have been satisfied by any of this, but then he has his own problems and they are not mine.