The Quest for Justification

Here are some recent thoughts about the quest for justification, particularly with regard to empirical observation.

The is-ought problem can be solved, but not in a way which would satisfy empiricists. The solution is analogous to Popper’s solution to the problem of induction, and is, perhaps, better described as a dissolution, rather than a solution. This dissolution, which is common to the problem of induction and the is-ought problem, involves shifting the conclusion to the premises and then trying to refute the premises by critical investigation. However, this move violates the central tenet of empiricism, where a "rational" conclusion must be derived from the contents of sense experience. In a way, the is-ought problem is a special case, since unlike the dissolution of the problem of induction, which we may consider important and useful, the dissolution of the is-ought problem leads to a rather uninteresting and redundant result.

The is-ought problem, like the problem of induction, is a problem of logical strength, and develops from the attempt to construct an argument where the conclusion is logically stronger than the premises, a move which immediately invalidates the argument. The solution is simple, and involves nothing more than restoring validity to the argument, by shifting the conclusion to the premises and restoring to them greater logical strength.

If you want to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' then simply include among your premises a proposition such as 'for every x which is the case then x ought to be the case'. This move is no different in principle from Popper's "solution" of the problem of induction, where we stop trying to derive the hypotheses of science from sense experience, and instead include them among the premises. The role of rational investigation is then to criticise these hypotheses. If we use evidence and scientific hypotheses nonjustificationally, that is, to criticise our ethical hypotheses--which are offered conjecturally as tentative proposals--then there does not arise an equivalent to the is-ought problem. The is-ought problem disappears with the problem of induction, which were products of an empiricist strand of justificationism.

The problem with empiricism in its traditional and modern formulations, is that it takes as a central principle that only beliefs which can be reduced to, combined from, or deduced using the contents of sense experience are to be considered 'knowledge', and everything else is to be rejected as 'sophistry and illusion'. Therefore, if a belief is to be classified as knowledge, then it must be justified by empirical observations, and if there are no empirical observations which justify a particular belief, then we have no right to believe it. The preoccupation with justification, and whether we have an epistemic right to some belief, betrays the fact that the quest for justification has taken priority over the search for truth, and it is often accompanied by an almost Puritanical concern with what others are permitted to believe. The question for a justificationist is not whether some belief or hypothesis is true, but whether we have any epistemic right to believe it relative to an authority, which here takes the form of empirical evidence.

The goal of justified belief, as opposed to the goal of true belief, can have some peculiar consequences; for example, if some proposition P and ~P are both unjustified then the empiricist is not permitted to believe either P or ~P, and will sometimes claim that the very question 'is P true?' is meaningless. The problem that then arises is how to behave: if we have no epistemic right to believe P or believe ~P then on what assumption should be make our decisions? It is simply not possible to behave as though P and ~P are both false, but neither are we permitted to believe either. The most common example of this quandary arises with respect to the existence of the Christian God, and the empiricist usually defaults to acting as though the Christian God does not exist, but why ~P and not P? In many cases, such as Russell’s teapot, there will be never be a choice where it makes any difference what we believe, but this is not so with respect to the existence of the Christian God, where being wrong may have serious consequences. The quandary described here arises directly from the quest for justified belief, and an implicit rejection of the search for truth, which is here exposed by the requirement that we can neither believe P nor believe ~P. If we take 'to believe' to mean 'to think is true' then it can be said that the empiricist does not think that P is true or that ~P is true. The question of truth and falsity is pushed aside and the issue of justification, or our epistemic right to believe, takes centre stage.