On the Right to Give Offence
Given my recent ramblings on political correctness and free speech, I found this article very thought provoking. Worth a read if you are interested in the problem.
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Given my recent ramblings on political correctness and free speech, I found this article very thought provoking. Worth a read if you are interested in the problem.
This was written to a respondent regarding a problem, namely: how can we best live together peacefully despite our disagreements and conflicts of interest? The first part is my respondent's answer to that problem, and the second my response to his answer. I only scratch upon the broader issue, but I thought it worth sharing here nonetheless.
Respondent: "This doesn't seem a difficult problem to solve. We can coexist peacefully by refraining from attacking each other in non-peaceable ways. A much harder question that needs solving first is, how can those of us who wish to coexist peacefully persuade all those who don't?"
Lee: "It might not seem like a difficult problem to solve but I think that "seeming" is deceptive. For example, imagine a factory which is polluting a nearby river, of which downstream a small community make use, or perhaps even depend upon. The pollution brings health hazards, lowers the value of land, destroys livelihoods and lowers the quality of life for the residents of the community. In other words, the owner of the factory, by conducting his private business, without intent to cause harm, imposes heavy costs upon others. How should the residents of the community downstream respond?
Of course, this is just a textbook example of the externality problem in economics, and the usual solution is a set of legislative measures which force the factory owner to incur the full costs of his pollution. The owner of the factory might be forced to compensate the residents of the community in various ways, find an alternative method of dispensing waste, or pay for the clean-up of the river. Important, with regard to our problem, is that the owner of the factory must be forced on threat of fine or imprisonment to clean up his act (excuse the pun).
The standard explanation is that freedom must be limited i.e. my freedom to swing my fists is limited by the proximity of your nose. In other words, if each has the freedom to do whatever they choose, then nobody is free from the tyranny which others choose to impose, and so freedom can be had only so far as our choices do not adversely affect others. If our free choice imposes costs upon another, then, as with our aforementioned example, legislation may be invoked to resolve the conflict, and the originator of the externality forced to pay the full cost of those choices.
However, there is a problem. I think that externalities are ubiquitous, and to resolve them all would destroy the open society. The clearest example of this is so-called "political correctness", or prohibitions against "hate speech". I think that such speech codes and prohibitions are an attempt to resolve an externality problem, one inherent in the very idea of free speech and open inquiry. In short, our communicated words and ideas, with or without intent to cause harm, can impose heavy costs upon others for which they are not compensated.
The consequence is a preoccupation with prohibiting words and ideas which cause offence, or in some way adversely affect another person or group. The words and ideas of others can often have an impact upon our lives which dwarfs the impact of a polluted river, by destroying another's self-confidence, offending their sensitivities, refuting a belief of great comfort, or dispelling a falsehood from which they had much to gain. Where a polluted river might make us sick or devalue our land, an idea can threaten to destroy our very identity and sense of self-worth, or can tear apart families and destroy reputations.
It is no wonder then that so many would try and enact prohibitions against such words and ideas, and to do so follows from the standard treatment of the externality problem i.e. the originator of the externality should be forced to pay the full cost of their choices, or when this is not possible should be prohibited from making those choices. I think it clear that this logic, if implemented consistently, is incompatible with a free and open society, since there are no limits to what ideas may adversely affact some particular person or group, and such prohibitions are completely blind to issue of truth.
How are we to reconcile such differences peacefully? I think this is a serious problem to address, and by no means simple, though it may often "seem" that way. For example, we would not tolerate the choice of a thief who would steal our possessions or the slaver who would commandeer our body as his tool, nor the polluter who would destroy our livelihood or cripple our health. But how about the speaker who undermines our faith? Proliferates damaging falsehoods about us? Or whose damning criticism causes us to sink into depression?
Should free speech be regulated, like the activity of our polluting factory owner, to compensate or prevent the costs it imposes on others? If we choose to not tolerate free speech, then how can we expect to live peacefully despite our disagreements and conflicts of interest? How can we hope to live in an liberal society, and partake in free and open inquiry, without freedom of speech? It seems to me that such a problem is far from easy to resolve, even though it may "seem" easy at first glance."
I was recently confronted by the following accusation from a respondent to some of the idea expressed in a previous post.
"Since you have immunized yourself on every front from any possible criticism from me, there is nothing more to be said"
This provoked me to one again try and explain my view, and I thought my message worth preserving here:
"I have done no such thing. I am suggesting that the interpretations of history and statistical analyses of society are highly problematic, and went to some length to explain why. This does not imply that I disregard such evidence entirely. For example, my view is that freemarket policies are usually the most efficient method of achieving economic prosperity, and this is of course a view open to criticism, especially from historical and statistical analysis. However, and I restate: I consider such analyses to be highly problematic. Moreover, I do not think it wise to use such research and analyses to guide social policy, in part because of the problem I have already discussed.
I refer you back to the problem I am interested in solving: how can we coexist peacefully despite our disagreements and conflicts of interest?
Of course, historical investigation will play a part in solving this problem, but there are difficulties. Primarily, the interpretation of historical evidence is conducted only in the light of theories, and it is rarely obvious what lesson we should learn. For example, some people interpret the great depression as a market failure, whereas others interpret as a government failure. The former learn the lesson that unregulated markets cause depressions, and an important role of government is to prevent or cure depressions when they occur; whereas the latter learn the lesson that government interference in the money supply causes depressions, and that government attempts to solve the problem will instead prolong it.
There are many other debates and disagreements which persist between smart, well-informed, and seemingly honest people: What caused the fall of Rome? How did the Holocaust happen? Why was slavery abolished? or relating to more contemporary issues: Is public healthcare more efficient? Do gun-control laws reduce crime? Is the minimum-wage hurting the poor? Does outsourcing transfer wealth overseas? The respective lists could go on and on, and in each issue you will find many smart, well-informed and seemingly honest people in disagreement. Moreover, these disagreements persist even when both sides are looking at the same evidence, because each interprets the evidence differently and reconciles it with their own view.
There are times when such moves are blatant, though I stress not always false, ad hoc deflections of criticism, but this is not always the case. Hume pointed out that we have no method to confirm the discovery of a cause and effect relationship, though as Popper added, we can hypothsise or conjecture such a relationship and test it. The problem is that the set of logically possible explanations is infinite, and it is no simple or obvious task to disentangle such complex systems, identify a cause and derive the lesson of history. For example, was the fall of Rome caused by barbarian invaders, or did the barbarians successfully invade because Rome was already falling?
It seems that there are many plausible, yet mutually inconsistent, answers to all these questions. The problem, is that each attributes different causes and predicts different consequences, and so while opposing views may each be plausible and consistent with the evidence, each would recommend a different policies to solve the problem of living together peacefully despite our disagreements and conflicts of interest. Moreover, in true critical rationalist spirit, I think the likelyhood is that each and every theory on the table is likely to be false, and the historical development of our knowledge would tend to suggest precisley that.
I think that using this method to decide policy preference is at best foolhardy, and at worst conceited. That is not to suggest that historical and statistical research does not inform my policy preferences, or my social and economic theories, but rather that I tend to place less importance upon them than others. Instead, I tend to be more concerned with our day to day interactions rather than interpreting the ebbs and flows of world history, and so tend to focus upon rules of good conduct and ethical principles.
Finally, I do not mean to denigrate historical or statistical research, nor avoid subjecting my ideas and theories to harsh criticism, but I will not pretend that a criticism is harsh or relevant when I think otherwise, nor will I shirk away from discussing the problems with criticism or limits of rationality. I hope that this will suffice as an explanation of my views, and more importantly how I am not immunising any of my views from criticism. I feel as though you are trying to catch me out, but really there is nothing to catch.
To discuss the problems with criticism is not to immunise anything from criticism.
Today I engaged in a debate on a Yahoo group I frequent called The CriticalCafe. I had some thoughts which I have decided to preserve here. It should be noted, I think these lessons apply as much history as any social science, particularly economics.
"I think that the interpretation of history is very difficult, since we work with so little information, and such a limited scope for testing. It seems to me that there are many plausable explanations for any set of facts, that our lack of imagination has a tendency to fool us into a conceited confidence in our own view. For example, think about the "great depression", which has been interpreted by many very smart people to teach utterly different lessons, because each applied a different theoretical interpretation of the same facts."
"I am not expositing the critical rationalist position, I am just stating my own thoughts regarding the social sciences and the limits of knowledge. I am not saying that knowledge on these matters is impossible, nor that any particular hypothsis is false. Instead, I am proposing that given the limitations of our knowledge, tendency toward bias, lack of imagination, and lack of testability, we should perhaps not be so confident of ourselves. In other words, the facts do not speak for themselves, but must be interpreted by theory, and the lesson learnt will depend on how the facts are interpreted.
The problem is one that I think all critical rationalists are aware of, and applies to every corner of scientific investigation. In fact, Popper addressed the problem by suggesting methodological rules to avoid "conventionalist strategems" i.e. ad hoc theories employed to deflect or dismiss contrary evidence. There is nothing logically inconsistent about such "conventionalist stratagems", and occasionally they are even true. For example, the discovery of Neptune was preceded by the conjecture of its existence, after the orbit of Uranus was seen to diverge from the predictions of Newton's laws.
I think that the social sciences have far more problems in this area, since it is more difficult to control for variables. In fact, I think this is why debate in economics rarely make any progress, since both sides can rally very convincing statistical analyses against their opponents, yet there opponents can always retort by postulating an unmeasured factor or dismissing some method, thus shielding their respective views from refutation. The thing is, as in the case of Neptune, in each and every case they could be right, and there really is a hidden factor or a method is flawed."
"I am not attempting to denigrate historical research, but rather inject what I think it a well-needed dose of humility. I am impressed by disagreement, often between smart, well-informed and seemingly honest people. Therefore, do not think it is simple to "learn the lesson of history", because the history must first be interpreted, and this interpretation will change the lesson to be learned. If you would be so kind to explain how this is such an obvious swindle, then I would much appreciate it."
Today I was browsing the Library of Economics and Liberty, when I happened upon a post by Bryan Caplan of EconLog.
Few philosophers attach any epistemological weight to the fact that other smart, well-informed people radically disagree with them. Of course, the fact of disagreement does not imply that you're wrong, but it's got to raise the probability.
The statement "it's got to raise the probability" is an utter muddle, or at least it seems that way to me. If evidence e does not imply that theory t is false, then how does evidence e imply that theory t is more probably false? What does it even mean to say that t is more probably false, and how does our awareness of e change that probability? For me, if t is false then t is false irrespective of whether any particular person is aware of e. I find the whole notion of t being probably false strange enough, but to then suggest that our awareness of the evidence effects the probability of t being false is mind bending.
The facts are objective, in the sense that what is a fact for one is a fact for all, but the idea that our awareness of particular evidence can influence the probability of a fact being a fact, it seems to me, is a whole load of muddled thinking. I think perhaps, that Caplan means by the term 'probability' something like 'confidence', but then what does an individual's degree of confidence have to do with what is true? I would rather act on a theory which I have little confidence in and is true, than act on a theory which I have a lot of confidence in and is false. Imagine trying to organise a rational debate around each participants confidence in a given theory...
"It's interesting that being deprived of a material possession is often energetically avoided, while being deprived of a useful personal characteristic (such as patience or empathy) is often overlooked." - Marisa Murphree
Friedrich Hayek was a hamster
All hamsters are economists
Therefore, Friedrich Hayek was an economist
