Open Society

A Note on the Problem of Induction

A note to a friend on the problem of induction.

"Regarding the problem of induction, when analysed in the context of Popper's critical rationalism, where rationality concerns critical preference and not justification, the problem does not arise. In other words, critical rationalists do not presuppose any principle, such as that of induction, or the uniformity of nature. Instead, critical rationalists propose uniformity in nature through theories, and do not presuppose it to justify theories.

In other words, critical rationalists do not presuppose, or commit to, any principle of induction, or uniformity of nature. It may be true, that for scientific investigation to bear fruit, nature must be uniform, but there is no need to presuppose it, since it is entirely possible that there is no uniformity. The purpose of scientific investigation is the search for laws that express regularities, though science cannot promise that there is anything to find.

That there may be no scientific laws to find is a possibility, but not one that a critical rationalist is eager to accept, and thus makes a methodological decision: to search tirelessly for laws and regularities wherever they may be, to conjecture and experiment. Ironically, we arrive at the view that there is uniformity in nature, by trying our best to find disorder, to bring every theory which proposes order, to the severest tests and criticism.

The problem of induction originally arose because it was supposed that synthetic statements must be justified by sense experience i.e. derivable from sense-data, or singular statements. That the principle of induction, or the uniformity of nature, are obviously synthetic statements, yet also irreducible to sense-data, or singular statements, caused the problem. It seemed that we could have no rational justification for any statement about the future.

It is because critical rationalism employs sense experience as a means of criticism, rather than justification, that the problem of induction does not arise. In other words, the critical rationalist does not try to derive theories from sense experience, but tries to contradict theories with sense experience. The method is reversed, and the problem of induction dissolved."

Ten Politically Incorrect Truths About Human Nature

Fun article, and with some very interesting arguments from evolutionary psychology.

Pinker on Language

Here is a very interesting talk by Steven Pinker, on The Stuff of Thought.

We Are Our Choices

It is a peculiar thing in much philosophical discussion, the bellitling of choice. By that, I mean the act of choosing, plain and simple. It seems to me that our choices make us who and what we are, and philosophy is impossible without them.

Though, you can be fairly sure, that wherever 'choice' is mentioned in philosophical debate, it is with a ring of resignation: we have to choose because there is no alternative, and choices are arbitrary. If it comes to making a choice, rational philosophy has failed. I can think of a few instances of this that have occurred to me recently, but in retrospect realise it is almost always there.

A respondent says "I don't think it is just a choice, but rather a matter of the evidence", as though it is not we who must choose to take into account evidence. Philosopher Simon Blackburn says, "In other words, human reason has a limited domain. It includes mathematics and logic... But when it comes to ethics we are in the domain of preference and choice."

A friend, when I first excitedly tried to explain Bartley's pancritical rationalism, a solution to a problem which had plagued us both, was somewhat less excited. It seems he was expecting an argument which would force the irrationalist to admit the error of his ways, hoping that the power of reason might compel.

The thing is, it is our choice to be rational, to care about logic, evidence, critical discussion, ethics, and our conduct with other men. It is not something which can be forced on us, not then or any other point along the way. It is a limit to rational discussion, that those who do not wish to participate in it will be unmoved by our arguments.

I cannot help but think that we are our choices, and this revolt against choice is ultimately a revolt against ourselves, for without our choices we are nothing at all.

(edit: "[philosophers] have choice, but seem to flee from it, want to hide from it, avoid it at all costs, a last resort where reason fails.")

The Logic of Rational Investigation

I was thinking today about how to define rationology, the study of rationality, ask and answer the question: what does a rationologist do? It occured to me that I already had the answer, Karl Popper provided it in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, though I would generalise his insights, as he did later in life, to encompass all rational investigation:

"The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be sucseptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man--whether it is a musical theme, dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory--may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevent to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge."

"Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic rather as do the rules of chess, which few would regard as pure logic: seeing as the rules of pure logic govern transformations of linguistic formulae, the result of an inquiry into the rules of chess could perhaps be entitled 'The Logic of Chess, but hardly 'Logic' pure and simple. (Similarly, the result of an inquiry into the rules of the game of science--that is, of scientific discovery--may be entitled ' The Logic of scientific Discovery'.)"

"My criterion of demarcation will accordingly have to be regarded as a proposal for an agreement or convention. As for the suitability of any such convention opinions may differ; and a reasonable discussion of these questions is only possible between parties having some purpose in common. the choice of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately a matter of decision, going beyond rational argument."

"Thus i freely admit that in arriving at my proposals I have been guided, in the last analysis by value judgements and predilections. But i hope that my proposals may be acceptable to those who value not only logical rigour but also freedom from dogmatism; who seek practical applicability, but are even more attracted to the adventure of sciencie, and by the discoveries which again and again confront us with new and unexpected questions, challenging us to try out new and hitherto undreamed-of answers."

Rationology is the study of rationality, or rather, the logic of rational investigation. This is quite clearly distinguished from modern epistemology, which in particular is preoccupied with questions of where ideas come from. I believe this may be the root of a great deal of misunderstanding regarding Popper.

The Rebel Sell

Here is an great article on consumerism by Professors Joseh Heath and Andrew Potter, though I do not support their conclusion. I simply cannot understand why limiting the freedom which leads to social competition would be at all desirable, or what alternative they imagine.

Anyway, nice article, which neatly explains the painful irony of "counter-culture."

Though of the Day...

"Earlier anti-liberals directly attacked liberty as an evil. Marx adopted a different stance - to attack liberty under the guise of expanding it. In so doing, he re-packaged despotism to please modern sensibilities - a feat of intellectual marketing which would have profound consequences for hundreds of millions of people in the next century." - Bryan Caplan